Abstract We define the model of an abstract economy with private information and a countable set of actions. We generalize the H. Yu and Z. Zhang's model (2007), considering that each agent is characterised by a preference correspondence instead of having an utility function. We establish two different equilibrium existence results.
INTRODUCTION
We define the model of an abstract economy with private information and a countable set of actions. The preference correspondences need not to be represented by utility functions. The equilibrium concept is an extension of the deterministic equilibrium. We present the H. Yu and Z. Zhang's model in [18] , in which the agents maximize their expected utilities. Our model is a generalization of H. Yu and Z. Zhang's one.
A purpose in this paper is to prove the existence of equilibrium for an abstract economy with private information and a countable set of actions. The assumptions on correspondences refer to upper semicontinuity and measurability.
The existence of pure strategy equilibrium for a game with finitely many players, finite action space and diffuse and independent private information was first proved by Radner and Rosenthal [15] . This result was extended by Khan and Sun [10] to the case of a finite game with diffuse and independent private information and with countable compact metric spaces as their action spaces. These authores have shown in [8] that Radner and Rosenthal's result can not be extended to a general action space. We quote the papers of M.A. Khan, K. Rath, Y. Sun [7] , [8] , [9] and M.A. Khan, Y. Sun [11] , [12] , concerning this subject of research. In [19] , H. Yu and Z. Zhang showed the existence of pure strategy equilibrium for games with countable complete metric spaces and worked with compact-valued correspondences. They relied on the Bollobás and Varopulos's extension [2] of the marriage lemma to construct a theory of the distribution of a correspondence from an atomless probability space to a countable complete metric space. They also studied the case of the game with a continuum of players.
The classical model of Nash [14] was generalized by many authors. Models were proposed in his pioneering works by Debreu [3] The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, some notation and terminological convention are given. In section 3, H. Yu and Z. Zhang's expected utility model with a finite number of agents and private information and their main result in [19] are presented. Section 4 introduces our model, that is, an abstract economy with private information and a countable space of actions. Section 5 contains existence results for upper semicontinuous correspondences.
PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
Throughout this paper, we shall use the following notations and definitions:
Let A be a subset of a topological space X.
1. F (A) denotes the family of all non-empty finite subsets of A.
2
A denotes the family of all subsets of A. 3. cl A denotes the closure of A in X. 4. If A is a subset of a vector space, coA denotes the convex hull of A.
Definition 2. Let X, Y be topological spaces and F : X → 2 Y be a correspondence.
1. F is said to be upper semicontinuous if for each x ∈ X and each open set V in Y with F (x) ⊂ V , there exists an open neighborhood U of x in X such that F (y) ⊂ V for each y ∈ U .
2. F is said to be lower semicontinuous (l.s.c) if for each
Lemma 1 [20] . Let X and Y be two topological spaces and let A be a closed (resp. open) subset of X. Suppose
is also lower semicontinuous (resp. upper semicontinuous).
Definition 3 Let (T , T ) be a measurable space, Y a topological space and
Remark. Let (T , T ) be a measurable space, Y a countable set and F :
Y from a measurable space into a metrizable space we have the following:
1. If F is measurable, then it is also weakly measurable; 2. If F is compact valued and weakly measurable, it is measurable. Definition 4 [19] . Let Y be a countable complete metric space, (T , T , λ) an atomless probability space and
Lemma 3 [19] . Let Y be a countable complete metric space, (T , T , λ) an atomless probability space and F : T → 2 Y a measurable corespondence. Then D F is nonempty and convex in the space M(Y ) -the space of probability measure on Y , equipped with the topology of weak convergence.
Lemma 4 [19] . Let Y be a countable complete metric space, and (T , T , λ) be an atomless probability space and
Lemma 5 [19] . Let X be a metric space, (T , T , λ) be an atomless probability space, Y be a countable complete metric space and F : T × X → 2 Y a correspondence. Assume that for any fixed x in X, F (·, x) (also denoted by F x ) is a compact-valued measurable correspondence, and for each fixed t ∈ T, F (t, ·) is upper semicontinuous on X. Also, assume that there exists a compact valued corespondence H : T × X → 2 Y such that F (t, x) ⊂ H(t) for all t and x. Then D Fx is upper semicontinuous on X.
Theorem 1 (Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem) [1] . A weakly measurable correspondence with nonempty closed values from a measurable space into a Polish space admits a measurable selector.
A Nash Equilibrium Existence Theorem
We present Yu and Zhang's model of a finite game with private information. In this model it is assigned to each agent a private information related to his action and payoff described by the random mappings τ i and
are measurable spaces. For a point ω = (z 1 , x 1 , ..., z n , x n ) ∈ Ω, τ i and χ i are the coordinate projections
Each player i in I first observes the realization, say z i ∈ Z i , of the random element τ i (ω), then chooses his own action from a nonempty compact subset D i (z i ) of a countable complete metric space A i , with D i (·) measurable. The payoff of each player i is given by the the utility function u i : A × X i → R, where A = j∈I A j is the set of of all combinations of all players' moves. Let µ be a probability measure on Ω. It is assumed the following uniform integrability condition (UI):
(UI) For every i ∈ I, there is a real-valued integrable function
Definition 5 [19] . A finite game with private information is a family (g 1 , g 2 , . .., g n ) that specifies a pure strategy for each player.
Definition 6 [19] . For a pure strategy profile g = (g 1 , g 2 , . .., g n ), the expected payoff for player i is
Definition 7 [19] . A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is defined as a pure strategy profile (g *
The following theorem is the main result of Zhang in [19] .
d) the uniform integrability condition (UI) holds. Then the game Γ has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
The Model of an abstract economy with private information
In this section we define a model of abstract economy with private information and a countable set of actions. We also prove the existence of equilibrium of abstract economies. Let I be a nonempty and finite set (the set of agents). For each i ∈ I, the space of actions, A i is a countable complete metric space and (Z i , Z i ) is measurable space. Let (Ω, F ) be the product measurable space, (
and µ a probability measure on (Ω, F ). For a point ω = (z 1 , ..., z n ) ∈ Ω, define the coordinate projections τ i (ω) = z i . The random mapping τ i (ω) is interpreted as player i's private information related to his action.
For each i ∈ I, we also denote by meas(Z i , A i ) the set of measurable mappings f from Z i to A i . An element g i of meas(Z i , A i ) is called a pure strategy for player i. A pure strategy profile g is an n-vector function (g 1 , g 2 , ..., g n ) that specifies a pure strategy for each player.
We suppose that there exists a correspondence
Let D Di be the set (µτ
: g i is a measurable selection of D i . For each i ∈ I, let the constraint correspondence be α i :
An abstract economy (or a generalized game) with private information and a countable space of actions is defined as Γ = (I, ((Z i , Z i ), (A i , α i , P i )) i∈I , µ).
Definition 9.
An equilibrium for Γ is defined as a strategy profile
.
Existence of equilibrium for abstract economies with private information
We state some new equilibrium existence theorems for abstract economies. Theorem 3 is an existence theorem of equilibrium for an abstract economy with upper semicontinuous correspondences α i and P i .
be an abstract economy with private information and a countable space of action, where I is a finite index set such that for each i ∈ I : a) A i is a countable complete metric space and (Z i , Z i ) is a measurable space; (Ω, F ) is the product measurable space ( i∈I (Z i , Z i )) and µ an atomless probability measure on (Ω, F ) ;
Ai is measurable with compact values; c) the correspondence α i :
Ai is measurable with respect to z i and, for all z i ∈ Z i , α i (z i , ·, ·, ..., ·) is upper semicontinuous with nonempty, compact values; d) the correspondence P i :
Ai is measurable with respect to z i and, for all z i ∈ Z i , P i (z i , ·, ·, ..., ·) is upper semicontinuous with nonempty, compact values; e) for each z i ∈ Z i and each (g 1 , g 2 , ..., g n ) ∈ i∈I Meas(Z i , A i ),
Proof. By Lemma 3, D Di is nonempty and convex. By Lemma 4, D Di is compact. For each i ∈ I the set
Ai by (λ 1 , λ 2 
We denote D Fi (λ 1 , λ 2 , . .., λ n ) = = (µτ
: g i is a measurable selection of F i (·, λ 1 , λ 2 , ..., λ n ) . Then: i) D Fi (λ 1 , λ 2 , . .., λ n ) is nonempty because there exists a measurable selection from the correspondence F i by Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardewski Selection Theorem.
ii) D Fi (λ 1 , λ 2 , ..., λ n ) is convex and compact by Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
We define Φ :
The set i∈I D Di is nonempty, compact and convex. By Lemma 5 the correspondence D Fi is upper semicontinuous. Then the correspondence Φ is upper semicontinuous and has nonempty compact and convex values. By Ky Fan fixed point Theorem, we know that there exists a fixed point
This is equivalent with the fact that g
. be an abstract economy with private information and a countable space of action, where I is a finite index set such that for each i ∈ I, a) A i is a countable complete metric space and (Z i , Z i ) is a measurable space; (Ω, F ) is the product measurable space i∈I (Z i , Z i ) and µ an atomless probability measure on (Ω, F ) ;
Ai is measurable with compact values; let D Di be the set (µτ
Ai is measurable with respect to z i and, for all z i ∈ Z i , α i (z i , ·, ·, ..., ·) is upper semicontinuous with nonempty, compact values; d) there exists a selector G i :
n ) is measurable with respect to z i and, for all z i ∈ Z i , G i (z i , ·, ·, ..., ·) is upper semicontinuous with nonempty, compact values; e) for each z i ∈ Z i and each (g 1 , g 2 , . .., g n ) ∈ i∈I Meas(Z i , A i ), : g i is a measurable selection of F i (·, λ 1 , λ 2 , ..., λ n ) . Then: i) D Fi (λ 1 , λ 2 , ..., λ n ) is nonempty because there exists a measurable selection from the correspondence F i by Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardewski Selection Theorem.
We define Φ : 
